Achieving reliability, availability, efficient node repair and security of the data stored in a Distributed Storage System (DSS) is of great importance for improving the functioning of these systems. In this work, we apply a data distribution concept, Twin-code framework, and compare it with a DSS that uses minimum bandwidth regenerating (MBR) and minimum storage regenerating (MSR) codes. We demonstrate that the Twin-code framework gives better performance in the distribution process. Moreover, we construct a new secure Twin MDS code and investigate its security performance comparing to the security of the MBR and MSR codes. The new constructed code is resistant against a threat model where a passive eavesdropper can access to the stored data and the downloaded data during the repair process of a failed node. We demonstrate that the Twin MDS code framework achieves better results than the MBR and MSR codes regarding the security in the system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed storage systems (DSS) may profit from the use of thousands of commodity servers. These systems store different types of data-files dispersed across the distributed servers (nodes) in the network. Each node in the system may produce a certain level of unreliability. Therefore, one of the most desirable feature in DSS is reliability. The simplest and most common form for achieving reliability is with replication. Three-times data replication as an industrial standard is the simplest form of protective data redundancy, with two more additional copies of the original object being created and maintained to be available if the original gets lost. However, due to the exponential growth of the stored data [1] this solution becomes very expensive and inefficient.
A smarter solution with less redundancy and better reliability is offered by erasure codes. Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) codes are erasure codes that are good choice for successful reconstruction of the entire message that is performed by the user (data collector). Suppose that the size in symbols of the data file is divided and stored on all nodes in the network. Each chunk of the file stored on a node is of size = , where ( < ) represents the number of nodes that need to be contacted by the user for reconstructing the full original message.
What is significant to be stressed, in the DSS design, is the issue when a node failure occurs. That invokes a loss of data of size . Therefore, a new replacement node (newcomer) must be added in the network that will perform the repair process for the missing data. The concept of exact repair process, recovering the exact lost data, that introduces the so called regenerating codes in DSS initially was proposed in Dimakis et al. [2] .
It was shown that there exist erasure codes that can provide repairing of the failed data without communicating the whole data object. This idea comes from the fact that such a procedure is inefficient in terms of network resources. Let ( ≥ ) is a number of nodes out of − 1 that are going to be contacted during the repair process and ( ≤ ) is the size of data that will be downloaded from each of the nodes. The correlation between the total downloaded amount = known as repair bandwidth and the storage is studied in [3] - [6] for achieving better results.
The parameters in the regenerating code that aim to store the maximum file size reliably must satisfy the following condition examined in [2] 
Based on the tradeoff between and the two extreme points can be obtained presented in [2] . In the reconstruction case when the storage per node tends to be at least the extreme point is termed as the Minimum Storage Regeneration (MSR) point. Otherwise, in a case when the repair bandwidth is equal to , the extreme point is referred as the Minimum Bandwidth Regeneration (MBR) point.
According to the fact that both extreme conditions cannot be satisfed at the same time, Rashmi et al. [7] propose a new called concept Twin-code framework for DSS that eases datareconstruction and node-repair during failure of some nodes.
An additional challenge in DSS is the security. A distributed data storage system is formed by many nodes widely spread across the Internet. So each node in such peer-to-peer network is vulnerable and a potential point for attack. The attackers can eavesdrop the nodes and possibly modify their data. This paper, besides the reliability of the stored data addresses the issue of its security. Note that, while eavesdropping on a particular node during the repair process, the intruder observes not only the originally stored data but also all the data that will be downloaded for repair.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II recalls the Twin-code framework functioning. In Section III by comparing the reconstruction and repair process of MBR and MSR codes vs. the Twin-codes, we show that the number of message symbols that can be distributed in the Twincode system is greater than the number of message symbols distributed by MBR codes and equal with the number of message symbols distributed by MSR codes. In Section IV we construct secure Twin MDS code framework and we prove that this Twin MDS code framework in presence of passive adversary gives better secrecy performance than both MBR and MSR codes. Section V concludes the paper.
II. TWIN-CODE FRAMEWORK
Within the Twin-code framework all nodes in the distributed network are partitioned into two groups: nodes of Type 1 (circles) and nodes of Type 2 (squares) as depicted in Fig.  1 . The message content that needs to be stored in the system first is encoded by using a linear code 1 and after that it is distributed on the nodes of Type 1. Simultaneously, the same message content is transposed and encoded by the linear code 2 and is distributed on the nodes of Type 2. Note that there is no rule for both codes to be distinct. As mentioned previously, the impact of using this framework is the improvement in terms of data reconstruction and repair process.
In the case of data reconstruction, the data collector will contact a subset of nodes of the same type for recovering the entire message, as shown in Fig. 1 (a) . When reparations of a failed node are done, depending on which type of node is affected, the process will be completed by downloading data from a subset of nodes from the opposite type, as shown in Fig. 1 When the linear codes 1 and 2 are MDS codes over , the data collector can perform the reconstruction process of the entire message only with contacting any nodes of same type. The amount of stored data that will be downloaded during this process is 2 = TW . In the case of a failed node, the newcomer from certain type must contact any nodes belonging to the opposite type. To recover the lost data just a single symbol from each node will be downloaded, that is = 1. We designate the Twin-code framework as Twin MDS code framework if the linear codes 1 and 2 are MDS codes.
Without loss of generality, we can separate the nodes in the Twin-code framework into systematic and parity nodes. The node is systematic if the stored symbols on it are original. And if the symbols on the node are not pure original, but some combination of them, then the node is parity. We assume repair process of only systematic nodes.
It is important to note that the connectivity in Twin-code framework must be at least 2 − 1 for satisfactory availability and higher guarantees. For more detailed explanation for the data reconstruction, repair processes and the advantages of the Twin-code framework the readers are referred to paper [7] .
III. COMPARISON OF DATA-RECONSTRUCTION AND NODE REPAIR IN DSS WITHIN REGENERATING CODES AND IN TWIN-CODE FRAMEWORK
In this section we compare the maximum number of message symbols that can be distributed by MBR and MSR codes with the maximum number of message symbols distributed within Twin-code and we show that the Twin-code framework gives better performance. Notation of this comparison is that the original message in the Twin-code is distributed on two type of nodes, meaning the total amount of storage is greater than of MBR and MSR codes.
The repair process within regenerating codes is established by downloading symbols from any subset of the remaining ( ≥ ≥ ) nodes. The total repair bandwidth is always smaller than the size of the message . In [2] , authors also establish that the parameters satisfy the bound (1).
MBR codes achieve minimal possible repair bandwidth = . Plugging = in (1), and replacing the inequality with equality, an MBR code, with no secrecy requirements, must satisfy
MSR codes achieve minimum possible storage at each node. Knowing that the message size is , each node stores = data. For message reconstruction, the data-collector contacts any nodes. Based on that statement, from (1) and replacing the inequality with equality when there is no secrecy requirement, MSR codes must satisfy
In the Twin-code framework, by definition, the size of the message that can be distributed in the system is TW = 2 . When the size of the message is larger than 2 symbols, the message first is divided into fragments of size 2 . In that case, the method is applied to each of these fragments and at the end all of them are concatenated. Plugging = 1, = = in (2), the size of the distributed file with MBR codes becomes
Comparing the message size from (4) and the size of the message TW in the Twin-code framework, we notice that the number of message symbols that can be distributed in the Twin-code system is greater or equal to the number of message symbols distributed by MBR codes when = 1.
Plugging = 1, = 2 − 1 in (3) follows the node storage is = and the size of the distributed file with MSR codes is = 2 . This indicates that the number of message symbols that can be distributed in the Twin MDS storage system is the same as the number of message symbols distributed by MSR codes when = 1 and = 2 − 1.
IV. SECRECY IN DSS
We consider an ( 1 , 2 ) eavesdropper model, 1 + 2 < , defined in [8] where an eavesdropper may gain access to: either the data stored in a subset of 1 storage nodes, where the set of eavesdropped indices is denoted by ℰ 1 , or to the data downloaded during the repair process of other 2 nodes, where the set of these observed indices is denoted by ℰ 2 , or both. This concept is generalized version from the eavesdropper model considered by Pawar et al. in [9] and [10] . In [9] an eavesdropper may gain access only to the data stored on the nodes, which indicates to the MBR point. When the repair bandwidth is strictly greater than the per node storage, then is considered the MSR point, meaning an eavesdropper gains more information if it has access to the data downloaded during node repair if compared to the case when it observes only the data stored on the node. The achievability of secure file size in this ( 1 , 2 ) eavesdropper model is formalized by the following definition:
Consider a DSS in which an eavesdropper gains access to the data stored on some 1 nodes, and the data downloaded during repair on some other 2 nodes. An ( 1 , 2 ) secure distributed storage system with secure file size ( ) is such, where an eavesdropper obtains no information about the message, i.e.
( ; e) = 0, where is the secure information of size ( ) , and e represents the eavesdropper's observation.
In [9] , Pawar et al. provided an upper bound to the number of message symbols ( ) that can securely be stored in the system in presence of eavesdroppers. The bound is given by
Since here we discuss about the exact repair for the MBR codes = , the replacement node downloads only the original stored data. In this case the eavesdropper cannot obtain any extra downloaded information from the repair process. Thus, without loss of generality it may be assumed that 2 = 0. Therefore, the upper bound for secure MBR codes from the equation (5) can be obtained with substituting = and replacing the inequality with equality. The upper bound of the MBR codes is
) .
For MSR codes, the eavesdropper has an access to 1 nodes, and listens 2 nodes that are in the reparation process. In 
So, the folowing question is open. Is it possible to obtain secure coding schemes at the MBR and MSR point that have better rate and/or secrecy capacity than that of the schemes proposed in [8] and [11] , respectively?
In this section, we answer the question. We define a new secure Twin MDS framework in presence of an ( 1 , 2 ) eavesdropper and we show that this framework gives better secrecy performance than MBR codes when = 1, = = and 2 = 0, ( 1 < ) and than the MSR codes when = 2 − 1 and = 1 + 2 ( < ).
The remark from the following sections is, when we consider storing of a secure file size ( ) in the DSS, the remaining − ( ) symbols can be utilized as an additional data that does not have security constraints. Yet, noting the possibility of storing this insecure data, we will refer to this uniformly distributed part as random data, which is utilized to achieve security. In the paper we use the following lemma to show that the proposed framework satisfy the secrecy constraints.
Lemma 1 (Secrecy Lemma [8] ). Consider a system with secure information f s , random symbols r (independent of f s ), and an eavesdropper with observations given by e. If (e) ≤ (r) and (r|f s , e) = 0, then the mutual information leakage to eavesdropper is zero, i.e., (f s ; e) = 0.
Proof. 
A. Secure Twin MDS code framework
In this subsection, we present explicit construction for a coding scheme that is secure against an ( 1 , 2 ) eavesdropper when ℰ 1 ∪ ℰ 2 ⊂ ℰ, for a given set ℰ of size |ℰ| < , all parameter values [ , , = ] and = , = 1. The constructions is based on Twin MDS codes such that the message matrix first is modified with TW − ( ) TW random symbols, where ( ) TW is the number of message symbols that can be securely stored in a Twin MDS framework in an ( 1 , 2 ) eavesdropper model.
First, we state the following property associated with the repair process in a Twin-code famework.
Lemma 2.
(i) Assume that an eavesdropper gains access to the data stored on = 1 nodes in a Twin MDS code framework. Then the eavesdropper can only observe independent symbols.
(ii) Assume that an eavesdropper has an access to the data stored on any 1 nodes and observes the downloaded data from 2 nodes that are in reparation process in a Twin MDS code framework. Then the ( 1 , 2 ) eavesdrooper can observe at most ( 1 + 2 ) independent symbols.
Proof. (i) Since the size of the stored data on each node is symbols by the construction of Twin MDS code the maximum number of independent symbols that the intruder can reveal is if ℰ 1 ⊂ [ ] 1 or ℰ 2 ⊂ [ ] 2 , i.e., when it gains access in the data stored on 1 nodes of same type. (ii) From Lemma 2 (i) in an ( 1 , 2 ) eavesdrooper model,
( 1 + 2 ) < the intruder can only observe 1 independent symbols when it gains access in the data stored on 1 nodes. Since in Twin MDS code framework the repair bandwidth is , i.e., a newcomer node of a certain type can recover the symbols stored in the failed node by downloading a single symbol from any nodes of the other type, the maximum number of independent symbols that the intruder can reveal is 2 if ℰ 2 ⊂ 1 or ℰ 2 ⊂ 2 when it gains access the downloaded data of 2 failed systematic nodes of same type. Therefore, the maximum number of message symbols that the intruder can reveal if it can read-access the data stored in 1 nodes and read-access the downloaded data during the repair process of 2 failed systematic nodes is ( 1 + 2 ). Now, we detail an achievability scheme of this section. There are 1 Type 1 nodes, and 2 Type 2 nodes, where = 1 + 2 is the total number of storage nodes in the framework. Note that the storage nodes of both types have the same characteristics. In the sequel we use the following notations:
• , = 1, 2 is an arbitrary ( , ) MDS code over with generator matrix ; • g ( , ) for all 1 ≤ ≤ is the -th column of , = 1, 2.
• [ ] is a set of indices of any repair nodes (nodes involved in repair process).
• [ ] 1 is a set of indices of any nodes of Type 1 and [ ] 2 is a set of indices of any nodes of Type 2. Let f s is secure information of size
in at MBR and MSR points, respectively, i.e., f s = ( 1 , 2 , ..., ( − ) ) or f s = ( 1 , 2 , ..., ( − 1 − 2 ) ). We take or ( 1 + 2 ) i.i.d. random symbols r = ( 1 , ..., ) or r = ( 1 , ..., ( 1 + 2) ) at MBR and MSR points, respectively; distributed uniformly at random over , and append r to obtain f = (r, f s ) ∈ , that will be encoded in the following manner:
• Arrange the message f = ( 1 , ..., 2 ) into ( × ) matrix 1 called message matrix as
where the superscript T denotes a transpose of a matrix. • For = 1, 2 each node of Type stores symbols from the appropriate column of the ( × ) matrix , i.e., in the node (1 ≤ ≤ ) of Type we store the symbols from the -th column of the matrix , = 1, 2 defined by g ( , ) .
With this encoding algorithm every node stores symbols and each node of Type is associated with a different column g ( , ) of , called encoding vector of that node. With this algorithm the data is encoded and mapped into the network. The data collector can perform the reconstruction process of the entire message only with contacting any nodes of a same type.
In the case of a failed systematic node, the newcomer from certain type must contact any nodes belonging to the opposite type. To recover the lost data just a single symbol from each node will be downloaded, that is = 1. For a successful repair process, in any moment, nodes from Type 1 and nodes from the Type 2 must be alive.
For example, if we assume that node m from Type 1 fails, the newcomer (replacement node) must recover the following k symbols 1 g (1, ) . Therefore, the newcomer contacts k helper nodes of Type 2. The -th helper node (1 ≤ ≤ 2 ) for all , 1 ≤ ≤ , sends the product of the encoding vector g (1, ) with the k symbols of the helper node 2 g (2, ) , i.e., g (1, ) 2 g (2, ) . So, the replacement node obtains access to the k symbols g (1, ) 2 [ g (2, 1 ) . . . g (2, ) ] .
Defining
the newcomer has access to [ g (2, 1 ) . . . g (2, ) ]
and is recovered by erasure decoding of the MDS code 2 .
Therefore, the symbols that have to be recovered at the newcomer are the symbols contained into the vector
Thus, the repair process of a Type 1 node is brought to the erasure decoding of the code 2 .
In Fig. 2 is presented example of secure Twin MDS code framework. The message TW = 9 symbols, consist of six random and three original message symbols, is distributed in the network with 1 = 4 nodes of Type 1 and 2 = 5 nodes of Type 2. In this example the information is recovered by contacting any = 3 nodes from same Type. The Twin-MDS code generator matrices are Regarding the ( 1 = 1, 2 = 1) eavesdropper model, at the figure are shown all compromised symbols obtained by eavesdropping the stored data on Node 1 of Type 2 and downloaded data in the reparation of Node 2 from Type 2. Next, we present the following results of security for the general coding scheme described above.
Theorem 1.
(i) The code based on Twin MDS code that is modifying the message matrix with random symbols, explained as above achieves a secure file size ( − ) in an ( 1 , 2 ) eavesdropper model, where 2 = 0 and = 1 < at MBR point with = and = 1.
(ii) The code based on Twin MDS code that is modifying the message matrix with ( 1 + 2 ) random symbols, explained as above achieves a secure file size
Proof. (i) The repair and data reconstruction properties of the proposed code follow from the construction code in [7] . We use Lemma 1 to prove the security of this code against an ( 1 , 2 ) eavesdropper with 2 = 0, = 1 .
Considering that e denotes the symbols observed by an eavesdropper, we need to show: (i) (e) ≤ (r) and (ii) (r|f s , e) = 0. It follows from Lemma 2 (i) that an eavesdropper observes independent symbols, and since |e| = , follows that (e) = (r), which is the first requirement for establishing the security claim. It remains (r|f s , e) = 0, i.e., to show that given the message symbols as side information, an eavesdropper can decode all the random symbols. To this end, without loss of generality we assume that the eavesdropper gain access to the data stored on nodes of Type 1. Now, define [ g (1, 1) . . . g (1, ) ] are the symbols that the eavesdropper has access to, given the secure message symbols as side information. The MDS property of code 1 guarantees linear independence of the corresponding columns of generator matrix [ g (1, 1) . . . g (1, ) ]
. So, recovering the random symbols r fromẽ is identical to data reconstruction in the original˜1 code designed for ( 1 , = ) and no eavesdroppers. Thus, given the secure message symbols, the eavesdropper can decode all the random symbols, i.e., (r|f s , e) = 0.
(ii) Similar as the proof of Theorem 1 (i). 1) , associated with ℰ 1 = 1 from Type 2 nodes -the rounded red square, and ℰ 2 = 2 from Type 2 nodes -the blue square.
B. Secrecy in Twin MDS code Framework and MBR and MSR codes
In this subsection we compare the secrecy provided by Twin MDS code framework with MBR and MSR codes in a presence of passive eavesdroppers.
From MBR point during the repair process the replacement node downloads only what it was stored so, we consider only 1 ( 1 < ) collaborating eavesdroppers which may gain access to the data stored. Theorem 2. The Twin MDS code framework gives better secrecy performance than MBR codes for = 1 and = = in presence of = 1 eavesdroppers, ( < ).
Proof. The size of the secure message symbols achieved with MBR codes when = 1 can be obtained by plugging = = in (6), and comparing it with the result from Theorem 1 (i), we get ( )
This means that the number of message symbols that can be securely stored in the Twin MDS code framework is greater than or equal to the number of the secure message symbols stored in a system using MBR codes.
From MSR point the repair bandwidth is strictly greater than the per node storage and an eavesdropper potentially obtains more information when accesses to the data downloaded during the node repair process. Using the upper bound of the achievable secure file size for MSR code (7) and plugging = 2 − 1 in it, the secure size file becomes,
Theorem 3. The Twin MDS code framework gives better secrecy performance than the MSR codes in a DSS, when = 2 − 1 and = 1 + 2 ( < ) nodes are compromised.
Proof. The node storage capacity in a DSS that uses MSR codes with = 2 − 1 is = . Therefore, comparing (12) with the result in Theorem 1 (ii), we get that ( )
This means that the secure file stored in the Twin MDS code framework is larger in size than the secure file stored by the MSR codes in presence of eavesdroppers of both types.
In Fig. 3 we compare the size of the secure message symbols in the Twin MDS framework storage system and DSS with (a) MBR code and (b) MSR code. The size of the secure message symbols decreases in all cases: Twin MDS codes, MBR and MSR codes as the number of passive eavesdroppers increases. However, the secure file size that supports the Twin MDS code (dots and squares, respectively) is greater than the secure file size supported by MBR codes (circles) when = 1, = = and 2 = 0, = 1 < and than the secure file size that supports the MSR codes (triangles) when = 1, = 2 − 1 and 1 + 2 < .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we considered the problem of securing a distributed storage data in a system under the Twin-code framework against eavesdropping. Two types of attack were taken into consideration. In the first type of attack, the eavesdropper is observing the data stored on any storage node in the system. And in the second one, in a case of node failure, the newcomer is a potential eavesdropper and all downloaded data needed for the exact repair process are observed. We constructed a new secure Twin MDS code framework under the aforementioned constraints, and we compared the results with the output derived using regenerating codes. For both, MBR and MSR points, the Twin MDS code framework gives better results than regenerating codes regarding the security. Besides the security we consider the efficiency of distribution process in the Twin MDS code framework compared with DSS constructed by MBR and MSR codes. We show that despite the large amount of total storage the maximum number of message symbols distributed within the Twin MDS code is always greater than the maximum number of message symbols that can be distributed by MBR codes and equal to the maximum number of message symbols that can be distributed by MSR codes, when the number of live nodes necessary for the repair process is equal to the minimum number of available nodes in the Twin-code, = 2 − 1.
